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A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, suffers, 
something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. . . . The stone is too 
heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else the properties undergone show it is fit for the 
use for which it is intended. The process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and 
the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. What is true of this simple 
instance is true, as to form, of every experience. The creature operating may be a thinker in 
his study and the environment with which he interacts may consist of ideas instead of a stone. 
But interaction of the two constitutes the total experience that is had, and the close which 
completes it is the institution of a felt harmony. 
—John Dewey ([1934] 1980, 45) 
 
This way of imagining experience takes the form of an encounter the outcome of which is 
unforeseen. It is a dialogue between the self and the world, searching for a “fit” that leads to a 
new place, an adaptation that gives rise to a new point of departure. It offers a definition of 
experimentation as integral to human experience, to being and moving in the world. 
—Anne Douglas (2012) 
 
 
In this chapter we analyse two interrelated projects across the fields of visual art and music, 
philosophy and anthropology. Calendar Variations (2010–11) is a visual activity initiated by 
Anne Douglas, visual artist and researcher. A Day in My Life (2011–12) mirrors this activity 
in music and is developed by Kathleen Coessens, pianist and philosopher. The two projects 
are research driven and frame questions about the relationship of improvisation to 
experiential knowledge. 
First, what might experimentation be in the context of experience of life and 
experience of art? Does improvisation as a concept and a practice offer new potential to 
inform experimentation in a distinctive way? 
	 	
We will use Dewey as a starting point for a phenomenological approach to experience 
as a form of ongoing experimentation and adjustment, a process of learning endemic to life 
itself. We will map this articulation onto Hallam and Ingold’s four characteristics of 
improvisation. These closely resonate with Dewey while nuancing/inflecting the resulting 
learning as an experience between people, formed socially and culturally. Moving deeper  
into experience, experiment, and improvisation as three key interrelated concepts, we look 
briefly at Bergson, who offers a way of imagining experience as time dependent: life is 
constantly in a process of formation that is unstoppable even in reflection. This implies a 
conflation of intuition and intellect into one single activity, leaving the artist-as-researcher in 
a paradoxical situation. How is knowledge created if we cannot look back on experience by 
stepping outside what is ongoing? Arnheim helps us to unravel this paradox: intellect and 
intuition are distinctive but interrelated modes of being. We limit ourselves in life, Arnheim 
argues, to what is useful and necessary to know, working within this contingent. Art enriches 
possible ways of imagining. These challenge and extend experience. 
We lay out this theoretical ground as the basis from which to analyse the two artistic 
projects. By interpolating between the theoretical and artistic experiences, we enlarge not 
only our perspectives on but also our actions in the world. 
  
From art as experience to art as improvisation via experimentation 
Dewey’s articulation of art as experience consciously positions the individual as a subject. 
Open-endedness emerges as a significant quality—“A man does something,” offers himself 
to the world around him, and through that action, mobilises that world in relation to himself. 
The world pushes back, offering resistance. Questioning the affordances of the environment 
as well as his own possibilities, he engages in action. He learns and moves on (see Dewey 
[1934] 1980, 45). Where an experimental endeavour in science might set out to validate and 
verify particular anticipated epistemic constructions and concepts, the experimental act here 
inverts this trajectory. Being responsive—open to the unexpected—demands an openness to 
what is as yet unknown and unforeseen. 
 This echoes Hallam and Ingold’s perspective on improvisation (2007, 1-14). For 
them, improvisation is a necessary and spontaneous way of coping with the world in which 
imagination, thought, and action meet again and again in situations that are both specific and 
unforeseen. Improvisation is dynamic, never static, never perfectly repeatable.  
Hallam and Ingold attribute four characteristics to improvisation (ibid.1). In the first 
place, they argue, improvisation is generative, meaning that it always creates something 
	 	
different, even minimally. The active unfolding of actions, even imitative ones, always 
contains unexpected variations, depending upon time, context, growth, and inner feelings. 
Second, improvisation is relational: it is continuously directed towards the other. In this 
sense improvisation is socially generative: it brings new elements into our interactions with 
others. It is also materially generative—as an interaction between one’s own body and the 
inner and outer world. Third, improvisation is temporal: it is always part of a dynamic 
ongoing action, an event, experienced in and adding to the narrative of life. It does not 
participate in chronological time because different improvisations all relate differently to 
different times—they depend on what came before and what comes after. Fourth and finally, 
it is “the way we work” (ibid.1): improvisation is an innate part of our human condition 
(Hallam and Ingold 2007; Douglas and Coessens 2012). 
The improvisatory act in experience as an openness to the unknown is also evident 
within the writings of a number of artists, including John Cage, Allan Kaprow, and Paul 
Klee. These artists consistently evolve their artwork as a form of inquiry, writing, analysing, 
placing, and shaping their endeavours within a much wider field of play than art itself, 
making connections culturally, socially, and politically.  
John Cage defined the experimental work as “one the outcome of which is not 
foreseen” (Cage 1958, 39). Allan Kaprow expanded this definition to embrace method as 
well as outcome: “Imagine something never before done, by a method never before used, 
whose outcome is unforeseen” (Kaprow 2003, 69). Paul Klee resonates with Cage and 
Kaprow, introducing a new dimension, that of movement. This dimension reminds us of the 
generative characteristic in Hallam and Ingold’s perspective on improvisation. Klee imagines 
the transition from stasis into movement in terms of a line shifting its position forward, 
constructing “a walk . . . without goal. A walk for a walk’s sake” (Klee 1953, 16). The line as 
walk moves us from an indefinable and undifferentiated state to feeling our way by creating a 
direction. By feeling, suffering, creating experiences within the “as yet not known,” activity 
(including thought) becomes concrete, expresses something that is never complete but always 
in formation. Again, as with Dewey, there is an open-ended process of learning by moving. 
Johan Siebers, the philosopher constructs a similar idea—“the notion of utopia is reconceived 
by Bloch, not as the programmatic march towards a perfect state of being, but as the active, 
secular, concretely anchored response to a foundational openness in existence. . . . We do not 
yet know what freedom, community, humanity, nature can be” (Siebers and Fell 2011, 5). 
However, for the purposes of analysis would it not be easier for us to treat the world 
as static and immobile than to imagine ourselves within its movement? “Our mind has an 
	 	
irresistible tendency to consider that idea clearest which is most often useful to it. That is why 
immobility seems to it clearer than mobility” (Bergson [1912] 1999, 44). This tendency to 
spatialise time falsifies experience in Bergson’s view. Bergson distinguishes intuition from 
the intellect, creating a polarity. The intellect (science) approaches experience from a point 
external and alien to experience. Through intuition (metaphysics), we enter into the thing 
itself, “immersing oneself in the current of direct awareness” (Goudge [1912] 1999, 12). Like 
Klee, Bergson encourages us to imagine making a drawing that begins as a point and unfolds 
as a line. In the case of Bergson, the line is constantly lengthening. By fixing our attention on 
the line not as a line but as an action by which a line is traced, we inhabit experience 
intuitively, by entering the thing itself, rather than intellectually by positioning ourselves 
outside it (Bergson [1912] 1999, 26–27). 
But do we need to choose between intuition and the intellect? Bergson places the 
artist-as-researcher in something of a dilemma within the polarities of intuition and the 
intellect. Within artistic research and artistic experimentation, the intellect by force co-exists 
with intuition, the analytical by force co-exists with the generative. This apparent paradox is 
the core of the challenge we set ourselves in this body of work. 
 
The two artistic experiments (2010–12) 
As artists and researchers we seek to understand the sense in which the whole art situation 
itself is constantly changing: genre, public, purpose, context, and form (Kaprow 2003,201- 
206). From the outset of this work, improvisation emerged as a key concept that allowed us 
to enter into experimentation as a living, situated, and discrete experience of managing both 
constraint and freedom. Each project is playfully framed, a means to enter into the world 
afresh. As artists we set up an experimental environment, allowing for moments of 
improvisation—in the sense of being open to the unexpected. This means we take away one 
step in which artists normally evolve expert languages and practices to a very high level of 
skill. In fact, improvisation in art is not immune to this kind of refinement and 
professionalisation—think of music improvisation in jazz. However, as contemporary artists 
and researchers, our experimentation is more concerned with understanding than perfecting 
skill. Each experiment might be described as a process of unlearning—a tactic of deliberately 
“suspending (dis)belief” (Douglas and Fremantle 2009, 1). In this sense we seek to reclaim 
an aspect of the meaning of improvisation as an encounter with “life without a script” 
(Hallam and Ingold 2007, 1). 
	 	
The two projects, Calendar Variations (2010–11) and A Day in My Life (2011–12), 
follow in chronological sequence. We will use the analytical framework of Dewey’s four 
stages: activity, resistance, adaptation, learning.  
 
On Calendar Variations (2010–11) 
Activity 
Calendar Variations is based upon “Calendar” (1971), a written score poem by Allan 
Kaprow (2003, 120), which invites the imagination into the environment of California, 
focusing on grass, moisture, time, and greenness. We took this score into our own context in 
Scotland, developing a variation. The project started with an invitation sent by Anne Douglas 
in July 2010 to the artist-researchers at Gray’s School of Art: Georgina Barney, Chris 
Fremantle, Reiko Goto, Janet McEwan, and Chu Chu Yuan. Kathleen Coessens later joined 
the experiment at the point it was presented to the public.  
The original emailed invitation went as follows:  
 
Dear All, I would like to invite you to participate in a small experimental drawing project. 
Here is the exercise. The following is a score by the artist Allan Kaprow 
Planting a square of turf amid grass like it 
Planting another amid grass a little less green 
Planting four more squares amid grass progressively drier 
Planting a square of dry turf amid grass like it 
Planting another amid grass a little less dry 
Planting four more squares in places progressively greener  
Activity, A.K., California, November 2 1971 (Kaprow 2003, 120). (Coessens and Douglas 
2011, 9) 
 
The score is a riddle that evokes time through states of change. The values of green to dry 
increase in contrast and then decrease, establishing equilibrium at its final point. Importantly 
the score does not take the form of an instruction but situates the reader directly in an 
everyday activity. One is already immersed in the activity through the present participle 
“planting” in a way that is both potent and economical.  
The motivation to embark on Calendar Variations came from a question and a 
discomfort with the way creativity in art had become absorbed in social/political discourse 
and cultural policy imperatives that consume the idea of participation. The score presented a 
set of possibilities to work with that encourage alternative ways of imagining. By 
	 	
understanding that Kaprow sought to develop social experience by artistic means, by 
revisiting a significant historical moment in which he advocated a blurring of art and life 
(Kaprow 2003), the score allowed the freedom to work from our own individual centres and 
also to create common ground within the group. 
 
Resistance 
As we worked, our differences as artists emerged strongly and confrontationally within the 
group, in terms of aesthetic approaches and related beliefs. Like the score, these escalated at a 
point in time. The lines of our drawings, “planting squares of turf,” at times became 
boundaries to contain and stabilise an aesthetic approach. At others, the drawings opened up 
choices, opportunities to experience differently and to accommodate difference. Generative 
and relational aspects of experience—as described by Hallam and Ingold (2007)—emerged, 
allowing us to move on. 
At first we interpreted the score more or less literally, negotiating a possible site of six 
metres by six metres at Woodend Barn Arts Centre, Banchory, Aberdeenshire. We spoke 
with turf farmers who could advise on simulating the conditions and gradations of green to 
dry. Contextualising the score in the real world is arguably a very necessary quality of the 
understanding, a means by which the score entered into our experience. It was only when 
activity threaded back a new idea, a new concept or narrative, in a sense resisting reductive, 
fixed interpretations, that we could move beyond a superficial reading of the words. The 
challenge was to suspend disbelief and become deeply immersed, giving ourselves over to 
the experience of allowing Kaprow to present a different world in which we too might adopt 
a different position, even a different character, through which to “see” differently.  




During 2010–11 Chris Fremantle made two drawings of a square of turf, one from his garden 
in Scotland and another from his father’s garden in the United States. Both drawings involved 
digging up turf from its surrounds (“green to green”) and transposing it to a domestic 
environment, from “green to dry,” creating the conditions for a still-life study. In approaching 
the exercise this way, he was doing what he knew how to do well: still-life drawing. He 
created compelling visual representations of turf as tonal drawings. He realised the score, 
elegantly transposing to the visual—a notion of score that one might find in music. In his 
	 	
words this was “a perfect abstraction to be made real through performance by someone other 
than the composer” (Coessens and Douglas 2011, 24). At the end of each drawing, he 
returned the turf back into the ground. 
In the first drawing, he carried the turf from one place in South-West Scotland to 
another in North-East Scotland, returning it to a different ground. This opened up a new level 
of awareness for him. It was the realisation that visual art could also be performative. By 
isolating the turf but not discarding it at the end of its “use” value to the production of his 
artwork, he came closer to the core problem articulated within Kaprow’s score. One could 
understand “green to green,” “green to dry” as processes of isolation and “dry to dry,” “dry to 
green,” “green to green” as processes of reverting to the original state. In this way, Fremantle 
perhaps made a complete action of the piece, not only by constructing a figurative image in 
response to the first line of the score poem but also by choreographing a set of movements 
that complete the action in “places” progressively greener or drier.  
 
Learning 
This in turn led to the deeper realisation that art in public is situated in the gap between site 
and non-site. His turf drawings were a movement between different sites: the site of the turf 
to the non-site of the studio. Making a drawing could be a movement in the world taken 
momentarily outside the world. By not discarding the first turf as an object, by carrying it 
with him to the group discussion and replanting it in a new home, a new set of possibilities 
emerged. Fremantle normally works as an arts manager/producer and as such is removed one 
step from the making of art. The project created an important space for a different quality of 




   
Figure 1. Chris Fremantle, drawings of two sods 55cm x 76 cm, 2010 and 2012, and their 
contexts. 
 
This is one of seven responses; each is different from the next and each is complex in 
Dewey’s pattern of taking action, of encountering resistance, of mutual adaptation, learning, 
and closure. The original score faded away. New “scores” appeared like small improvisatory 
leaps. These leaps could not have been anticipated or pre-planned. They emerged out of the 
particular individual in response to their specific situation—material and social—shaped 
through an encounter with the score. The resulting newly created objects became accessible 
to others within new interactions and thereby enlarged the sense of play. As such they echo 
Hallam and Ingold’s understandings of improvisation as a necessary and spontaneous coping 
in unforeseen circumstances. 
In a second stage of the project, the artists worked together to figure out how to 
“perform” the score as a shared experience, following closely what they understood to be 
Kaprow’s aesthetic. Kaprow drew directly from Dewey the idea that artistic experience is not 
located in the forms of objects, media, or genres but that art is shaped by a lively interaction 
with social processes and human shared encounters. As such, the performative and 
contextualised “happening” of these experiences contain the quality of improvisation as an 
	 	
intervention in the everyday. They bring in the important notion of art as part of the human 
condition, and echo Hallam and Ingold’s fourth condition of improvisation as an inherent part 
of life.  
Moving deeper into Kaprow’s reconception of art, we agreed to realise the score 
through improvisatory walking. This choice—a combination of many journeys, individual 
and shared—culminated in a few simple decisions: 
 
We threw a dice to determine who would go first, who would plant the first square and by 
doing so create an equivalent between making a mark on a piece of paper and moving in this 
particular place and space. Reiko, an ecologist artist, walked the first square through the long 
space. She could not see her trace; she repeated it. One by one we each joined in at intervals 
walking behind or alongside, until we were all in the square walking round and round each 
other, impressing the long grass into a mark. Through repetition we embodied the score’s 
patterns with increasing familiarity letting the writing emerge through flattening the grass, 
keeping up, judging distance. By the afternoon our performance was seemingly effortless, 
intuitive as if all that mattered was that very particular moment of experience. Being free in 
that moment somehow meant finding an equilibrium between our inner world experiences 
that had brought us to this point and the outer world we were sharing with others. It was like 
finding, mastering a new sound as one single activity, sensing and acting, judging and 
listening as new experiences unfolded as if for the first time. It was at this point that I really 
understood Kaprow’s aesthetic idea. Engaging with the riddle of the score in our own time 
and space, sharing activity, reaching agreement on how to act, constituted the work of art. 
Since that moment we have been challenged by exhibiting this sense of improvisation. 





Figure 2. Calendar Variations, drawing realised as an improvised walk, 5 August 2010. 
 
If we had approached this project through the first definition of experimentation—the 
discovery of what is unknown or uncertain by “putting something to the proof”—its 
trajectory of development would have been very different. Instead we followed the second 
definition, aligning experimentation with experience. We followed an open-ended trajectory, 
taking the score into our creative imagination and experience, leaving traces through drawing 
in the outer world as a means to a new cycle of experience in our inner worlds. Improvisation 
in the sense of a spontaneous and imaginative coping with the unexpected was a pivotal idea. 
The score held us in its own rhythm and momentum, in its possible meanings, in the 
fragments of layering and overlapping, each gesture, idea, or thought modifying, contesting, 
clashing with, or complementing the next, then re-entering consciousness differently. This 
temporality of the experience, taking its own pace, resonates with the third characteristic of 
Hallam and Ingold. Our discipline was to attend, to keep moving with this momentum, to 
resist falling into familiar grooves or simply selecting “what we liked” (Cage’s objection to 
improvisation [Kostelanetz 1987, 222]). This was our form of improvisation inside an artistic 
experimental setting. 
	 	
This reflection (and analysis) can be imagined as an extension of the same quality of 
process—of open endedness, movement—but it is qualitatively different in being 
predominantly intellectual, recalling selectively the moments of struggle and moments of 
insight within a new narrative that sets out to be a point of learning. Bergson acknowledges 
this tension along with the importance of analysis but, like Dewey, emphasises the primacy 
of experience, of encountering phenomena through which we connect analytical forms with 
experience. “I could never imagine how black and white interpenetrate if I had never seen 
gray; but once I have seen gray I easily understand how it can be considered from two points 
of view, that of white and that of black” (Bergson [1912] 1999, 60). Bergson (ibid.) raises a 
powerful metaphor for acts of reflection and analysis. 
 
Something here dominates the diversity of systems, something, we repeat, which is simple 
and definite like a sounding [our emphasis], about which one feels that it has touched at 
greater or less depth the bottom of the same ocean, though each time it brings up to the 
surface very different materials. It is on these materials that the disciples usually work; in this 
lies the function of analysis. . . . But the simple act which started the analysis . . . proceeds 
from a faculty quite different from the analytical. That is, by its very definition, intuition. 
 
“Sounding” as metaphor is a gerund, a movement in process, used here to describe an 
intervention in the ongoing flow of experience as a looping back. Through this metaphor 
Bergson subtly avoids the stasis of analytical processes that he has earlier criticised as a 
stopping, a process of spatialisation that falsifies experience.  
Arnheim, as an art theorist and psychologist, argues more boldly in favour of the 
coupling of perception and thinking, intuition and intellect: “Thinking requires a sensory 
basis” (Arnheim 1986, 14). This coupling is useful to artistic research in embracing both 
aspects of the task that it sets itself. Arnheim (1966, 7) observes that the arts are among the 
“most puzzling implements man has ever made”—illusive, but nonetheless accessible to 
understanding. He draws on the arts as a means to understand human cognition. They offer 
“an uneasy rapprochement between the philosophical and poetical interpretations of the mind 
on the one hand and the experimental investigations of muscle, nerve, and gland on the 
other,” an attempt to deal scientifically with “the most delicate, the most intangible, and the 
most human among the human manifestations” (ibid., 1–2). “The dancer does not act upon 
the world, he behaves in it” (ibid., 261). Arnheim is not the dancer but looks in on the dancer. 
In a bid to free the sensory from the aura of poetic inspiration by giving it a name, Arnheim 
	 	
(1986, 16) articulates intuition as “a cognitive capacity reserved to the activity of the senses 
because it operates by means of field processes, and only sensory perception can supply 
knowledge through field processes.” In formulating a whole, creating a stable image out of 
the complexity within the field, all components depend upon one another, one colour depends 
upon the colour of its neighbours. Interestingly Arnheim notes that in everyday life, we limit 
ourselves to what is necessary to notice in order to move around. But in art, we engage in an 
improvisational dialogue with experiential knowledge that is constituted of more stable 
entities. The kinesthetic control of the bicycle rider repeats itself in the movements of the 
dancer. The dancer works intuitively with the language of dance: the shared signs, symbols, 
and patterns of movement. The bicycle rider focuses to stay upright and in motion—a more 
primary level of experience. In this sense Arnheim embraces the complexity of the human 
mind as “double edged.” 
 
We will explore the implications of the new level of complexity Arnheim offers in the 
second experiment, A Day in My Life. 
 
On A Day in My Life (2011–12) 
Activity  
As the experience of Calendar Variations had opened up new possibilities by deploying a 
seemingly “alien” element in the form of a verbal poem score, Kathleen Coessens and fellow 
researchers at the Orpheus Research Centre in Music (ORCiM) wanted to continue with a 
parallel project that would allow for similarly diverse, collaborative, and often improvisatory 
outcomes, merging everyday life and artistic expertise. This time the work was to be in the 
field of music. Coessens established the following experimental setting for A Day in My Life 
in May 2011. The research aim was to understand the kinds of transformations that might 
occur between individual experiences of everyday life and the artistic domain, on the one 
hand, and between visual/verbal and sound/aural perception, on the other.  
There were two stages to the project. The first was to see the processes of 
transformation as a translation from verbal to aural and to map them, understanding and 
revealing both the individual artistic trajectories and the semiotic translations of the text into 
sound. How and why did an artist take this or that approach or perspective, choose those 
materials and not others, and develop those particular constructions? The second stage set out 
to take the knowledge that resulted from this into new forms of artistic creativity. How could 
one set of created works become material for new created works? 
	 	
A text by Kathleen Coessens, A Day in My Life, was used as the starting point—an 
equivalent to Kaprow’s score. Like the score, the purpose of the text was to provide a means 
for the participating musicians to enter into their own artistic/aesthetic experience. Artists 
were asked to interpret the text in a sounding result, implying personal artistic actions of 
translation and transformation.  
 
A Day in My Life—score 
 
Turning on the radio—discovering a first sound 
Walking around in nature—collecting another sound 
Listening in a dark room—embracing a sound of night 
 
Exploring the activity of your heartbeat 
and the rhythm of a conversation 
adding a measure of time and process 
 
As an anthropologist 
giving the sounds a space 
merging culture and nature 
questioning alternatively 
subjectivity and collaboration 
 
As an ethnographer 
recreating the patterns of time 
under the blows of rhythm 
embedding alternatively 
improvisation and constraint 
 
Merging nature and culture once more 
in waves to listen 
in waves to walk 
before making a (w)hole 
growing into silence 
 
Kathleen Coessens, May 2011 
 
	 	
Let us consider the score. It is a written text offering open-ended instructions for 
exploring the relation between everyday experiential knowledge and artistic know-how. The 
score reveals life as an experiential activity: it has a beat, a rhythm, a movement, sounds. It 
describes life as being performed in movement and through trajectories, gesture, and 
motion—movements in space and time. In these elements, music resembles life. The score is 
an invitation to create music out of life experiences—everyday materials, embodied and 
enacted in the now—and to look at art as a form of intensification that links the energies and 
intensities of the lived body to the rhythms and forces of the earth itself (Deleuze and 
Guattari [1987] 2004, 310–50).  
For a first elaboration of the experiment, we requested a number of musicians to 
prepare and perform the following experiment: 
 
Take the score/text and create your own sounding version of it. 
First, find the musical output that suits your interpretation best: make a traditional, or non-
traditional score, create a specific sound set-up for performance, develop a full piece out of it. 
Secondly, document your choice and the process of elaboration of your musical output 
(questions, hesitations, materials, narratives). 
Thirdly, the title of the text is not “just” a title, but an invitation to explore the findings of an 
actual day in your life. We also ask that the maximum duration of the musical output should 
be no longer than 24 minutes. (Coessens’s emailed instructions to artists, June 2011) 
 
Different versions of A Day in My Life were created in a metaphorical as well as literal sense. 
Everyday materials developed into pieces of music, which in turn became the material for 
other music creations. As the different artists and groups merged and collided with the 
complexities of the material, individual and group outputs emerged. As these took shape, the 
possibilities for manipulation multiplied.  
Juan Parra developed a sound layer based on a drone effect—a sound effect where a 
note or chord is continuously sounded throughout most or all of a piece. Figure 3 shows the 
brainstorming between Juan Parra and Kathleen Coessens triggered by the different 
translations and transformations between the text as score and its sonification. This is one 
perspective of A Day in My Life. Parra created a version of A Day in My Life as a contribution 
to the $100 Guitar Project.1 
																																																								
1	On	20 October 2010, Nick Didkovsky and Chuck O’Meara bought a one-hundred-dollar electric guitar from 
Elderly Instruments. They did not know what it sounded like or if it even worked, but were charmed by its no-




Figure 3. Mapping and conceptualising the transformation processes of Juan Parra’s 
sonification of A Day in My Life, 2011. 
 
In a different response, Catherine Laws created twenty one-minute sound tracks on the basis 
of environmental sounds of one day in her life. They offered minimal sound representations 
of everyday noises of nature and culture and part of her movements and habits: being on a 
train, writing, hearing the calls of birds. She then translated some of these sounds into short 
ideas and material to improvise on an extended piano (see figure 4). 
																																																																																																																																																																												
charmed. The $100 Guitar is now passing through the hands of guitar players, each of which will record a piece 
with it (anywhere from a few seconds to three minutes long), and then pass it on to the next player. 





Figure 4. Catherine Laws’s notes for A Day in My Life, 2011. 
 
Kim Cunio and Vanessa Tomlinson made a twenty-four-minute musical performance 
of the text, bringing to it their own life experiences as well as their artistic expertise.2 
Everyday life is made up of new encounters and events that occur simultaneously and to 
which we have to adapt. These dynamics are mirrored in the musical creations that resulted. 
The score forced some of the artists to reflect more upon the relation between their daily lives 
and their artistic practices, putting them in a situation that was unfamiliar. The process was 
generative, leading to different rich outcomes. 
We gathered the first results of individual and group musical outcomes and 
considered them as new materials from which to create a single piece.  
 
Resistance and adaptation 
																																																								
2 The twenty sound compositions by Catherine Laws, as well as the version by Kim Cunio and Vanessa 
Tomlinson, http://mosamplab.posterous.com/#!/a-day-in-my-life-preparations-partial-contrib. page discontinued	
	 	
The project A Day in My Life entered its second phase with a concert at the ORCiM artistic 
Research Festival3 in Ghent during October 2011. Seven musicians came together to set up a 
collaborative version in two rehearsals and an end concert. They started to experiment in the 
joint session, each sticking to his or her original version. The awareness of their significant 
differences—coupled with the fact that the performance space could not support such 
contrasts between simplicity and complexity, subtle and powerful sounds—yielded the need 
to approach the challenge differently. The participating musicians started to negotiate ways to 
communicate musically. The first rehearsal was chaotic and noisy, each artist trying to find a 
space as if in a crowded train. Everybody wanted to “play.” Frustrations and confrontations 
emerged, while, as in a train, everybody continued to try to respect one another. Resistance 
and adaptation followed each other rapidly. In contrast, in the second rehearsal, the waves of 
music became much more introverted: musical patterns started to emerge calmly. Everybody 
“listened.” Both improvisatory rehearsals were completely different from each other, and in a 
certain sense both were somewhat unbalanced. Time impeded more adaptation. Just as in 
improvisation in life, in which we have to respond immediately and without reflective 
thought, the artists had to create a real concert in a moment from these two preliminary 
experiences of the new material. 
 
Learning 
The twenty-four-minute performance was different from the rehearsals. The musicians were 
still searching for equilibrium, still adapting, still finding space. But as with improvisation in 
life, there was no other chance to refine, to adapt, to create an optimum interaction. The 
process was still in its experimental phase, and thus still in a phase of improvisation within 
that experimentation. The experiment was not closed, not concluded. In the act of the concert, 
experimentation and improvisation merged. The artists found themselves in a vulnerable 
position. They had to create the best possible improvised performance in the best possible 
world of that moment. For the outsiders, the audience, it was clear that this setting was 
moving forth and through processes of the known and the unknown, improvisation and 




3 The improvisation-performance happened on 5 October. The participating artists were Kim Cunio (hurdy-
gurdy), Vanessa Tomlinson (percussion), Eliot Britton (electronics), Erika Donald (electric cello), Ben Duinker 
(percussion), Juan Parra (guitar and electronics), and Catherine Laws (piano).	
	 	
It is clear that this improvisation-experimentation setting resonated with everyday life 
improvisation, as discussed by Hallam and Ingold. However, the concert experience was 
neither rewarding nor generative at this point—at least for the musical performers—because 
the musicians stayed in a very experimental setting for which they still had no right answer, 
each time around trying different improvisational responses. The complexity of the relational 
aspect—playing with so many unknown artists—and the differences in preconceived ideas 
about it, contradicted each other and became obstacles. Experimentation and improvisation 
do not necessary lead to improved experiences—of learning, for instance—but can leave the 
experimenter/improviser puzzled. 
A Day in My Life brings into play the structures of thought that Arnheim (1986, 29) 
describes as “intuitive perception” and “intellectual analysis,” as well as drawing into play a 
performative relation between motion and emotion. Arnheim might describe the first phase as 
a grappling with the immediacy of experience—gathering sounded responses, making notes, 
sharing possibilities. He might describe the second as intellectual cognition—a linear, 
diachronic process of making connections between “standardised units,” such as in the note-
to-note, sound-to-sound protocols of notation, composition, and performance. For example, 
in the video of him preparing for his $100 Guitar Project performance, Parra assigns sounds 
to each stanza of the text score and plays these in the sequence of the original text. The whole 
has a rich and diverse complexity while still working as a whole. Tomlinson carefully selects 
everyday objects as potential percussion instruments, including upturned rice bowls, chains, 
and wine bottles collected from the site of the performance. In other words, both forms of 
cognition—intuitive and intellectual—are necessary and mutually dependent activities 
necessary to make sense of the work of art in the same way as we make sense of the world. 
Being open to the uniqueness of the moment of interaction with the world in specific 
experience checks any tendency to view the world purely through generalised stable entities. 
Likewise, unique and specific experience without generalisation does not allow us to learn 
from experience and transfer knowledge from one situation to the next. 
 
In conclusion 
We began with two questions: What might experimentation be in the context of experience of 
life and experience of art? Does improvisation as a concept and a practice offer new potential 
to inform experimentation in a distinctive way? 
 We referenced Dewey as a starting point for a phenomenological approach to 
experience as a form of ongoing experimentation and adjustment, a process of learning 
	 	
endemic to life itself. We mapped this articulation onto Hallam and Ingold’s four 
characteristics of improvisation; we explored the characteristics as time dependent and 
investigated their inflection towards the social and cultural. Bergson too imagines experience 
as time dependent: life is constantly in a process of formation that is ongoing even in 
reflection. This movement is also a quality of artistic forms of conceptualisation in Cage and 
Klee; it implies a conflation of intuition and intellect into one single activity: imagining 
ourselves in the line (the life process) as it is being drawn. The artist-as-researcher is left in a 
paradoxical situation: how is knowledge created if we cannot look back on experience by 
stepping outside what is ongoing? Arnheim articulates intellect and intuition as distinctive 
but interrelated modes of being. We limit ourselves in life, Arnheim argues, to what is useful 
and necessary to know, working within the contingent. Art enriches possible ways of 
imagining. These challenge and extend experience.  
The two artistic projects, Calendar Variations (2010–11) and A Day in My Life 
(2011–12), are experiences that set out to be consciously experimental and improvisational. 
Each project constructs a setting. By purposely framing the setting (e.g., through the tactic of 
verbal scores), we established the ground of an experience, demystifying—to an extent 
freeing—artistic endeavour from the “aura” of poetic inspiration by opening experience up to 
scrutiny. Each individual participant was invited to respond, exploring the score’s 
particularity as a shared element across a group through one’s own centre and view of the 
world as it takes shape within an artistic practice. The settings predispose each individual 
towards the unknown and unexpected: visual artists do not normally work with “scores”; 
musicians do not normally work with scores that do not determine note-to-note procedures. 
In creating art, the participants engaged the senses in exploring materials. They also engaged 
in processes (musical and visual) that involved negotiating the presence and meaning of the 
work as a group, experiencing tension and contradiction in that process, encouraging each of 
us to rethink the kinds of assumptions that had accrued around our artistic approaches. 
Together we documented, analysed, and made public the creative outcomes, to an extent 
testing these with audiences, who became participants in the endeavour.  
Aesthetic perception is already a special case, as Arnheim argues, of watching 
intuition at work. There is a palpable difference between the actions of a cyclist and those of 
a dancer, who calls upon us to experience by looking in on his or her actions. Within artistic 
research practice we build in yet another layer of observation, containing experience in such a 
way that we can scrutinise closely the inner and outer world of our actions and offer these to 
critique. This critique occurs within the artists working as a group as well as with the 
	 	
audience: we observe Fremantle, Tomlinson, and Cunio dealing with the challenge and 
confusion of an unfamiliar creative opportunity, striving to create a balanced order not as a 
rationalisation but as a moving on and into new forms of creativity and insight, generalising 
from the particular. In this way Fremantle, for example, offers us a new insight into site and 
non-site grasped through his experience. We are watching intuition at work and moving 
through its possible articulations. 
 In answer to the second question—does improvisation as a concept and a practice 
offer new potential to inform experimentation in a distinctive way?—we might observe the 
following: While improvisation in life is part of a contingent situation that we haven’t 
chosen, experimentation is part of an explicit position and choice. However, inside artistic 
experimentation, the unexpected can pop up and invite an improvisational intervention. 
Improvisation in art is a particular approach to form building. This may be defined as a 
concern with “the inevitable situatedness of the improvisor in a work, the contingency of that 
work, and . . . the agility necessary to avoid becoming trapped in the communicative 
community created by it” (Peters 2009, 3). In our experiments we are concerned neither with 
finished works nor social interaction per se, but rather with a deepening of experience 
through movement that “‘interrupts’ the given and produces difference” (ibid., 4, in part 
quoting Walter Benjamin). In others words we are seeking the kind of freedom and open-
endedness that allows us to encounter experience, even familiar experience, as if for the first 
time, to open up our senses to new possibilities while tracing the path as it unfolds. 
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